Rootsi mudel ei ole lahendus vaid petlik miraaz

Hiljuti on taas lahkamist leidnud Rootsi mudeli eripärad kahes pikemas artiklis.

Neist esimeses How the Welfare State Corrupted Sweden lahkab Per Bylund mentaliteeti, mida heaoluriik soosib ja sageli lausa eeldab. Teises artiklis, Swedish Models, selgitab Johan Norberg aga natuke täpsemalt heaoluriigist tuleneva mentaliteedi tagajärgi.

Per Bylund on põline rootslane, kes jälgib Rootsi heaoluriigi tekkimist läbi kolme erineva põlvkonna ning seda, kuidas töökate inimeste head kavatsused on aja jooksul rappa läinud, muutnud läbi riikliku poliitika inimeste suhtumist iseseisvusesse, ärisse, sotsiaalabisse ja vähendanud uute põlvkondade iseseisvust ja initsiatiivikust:

The formerly held truth that production precedes consumption is replaced by a belief in having an inviolate and natural "human right" to welfare services supplied by the state. Through the powerful labor unions, wage-earning Swedes were awarded raises every year regardless of real productivity, and in time annual raises of salaries became normality. People who didn't get a raise started considering themselves "punished" by their evil employer, and there were increasing demands for legal help in the struggle against employers. One has a "right" to a better salary next year just as the current salary must be better than last year's; so the thinking goes.
. . .
The only perceivable way of finding jobs for the young seems to be to "relieve" older people of theirs; job positions are scarce and unemployment is increasing even as demand for goods and services is going up – thanks to heavy state regulation in the marketplace. The welfare state creates problems and conflicts on many levels, forcing people to compete for shares of continuously decreasing wealth. The solution: more regulation and even less prosperity. This is what happens when need and want replaces merit and experience in both public and personal morality.
. . .
The social engineers of the welfare state obviously never considered a possible change in morality and perception — they simply wanted a system guaranteeing security for everybody; a system where the able could and should work to support themselves, but where the unable too could live dignified lives. Who would have thought the progressive reforms to secure workers' rights and prosperity for all in the early 20th century would backfire philosophically and morally?

Kuigi Bylandi artikkel on pigem isiklikust kogemusest lähtuv on ta siiski ülevaatlik ja annab hea ettekujutuse sellest, mis suunas on rootslaste mentaliteet heaoluriigi poliitikate tulemusena arenenud.

Johan Norberg pöörab enda artiklis rohkem tähelepanu Rootsi mudeli majanduslikule küljele nagu ka sellele, kui absurdne on emuleerida Rootsi mudelit:

To say that other countries should emulate the Swedish social model is about as helpful as telling an average-looking person to look like a Swedish supermodel. There are special circumstances and a certain background that limit the ability to imitate. In the case of the supermodel, it is about genetics. In the context of economical and political models, it is about the historical and cultural background.

Norberg täpsustab Rootsi mudeli eeldusi ja ka natuke ajaloolisi eripärasid, mis ei tohiks Vabalogi lugejatele üllatusena tulla. Samas jõuab Norberg üpris kiiresti sarnasele järeldusele Bylundiga, et põhimõtted ja eeldused, mis võimaldasid heaoluriigi loomist, leiavad heaoluriigi tingimustes pigem õõnestamist kui tuge.

Norberg toob välja ka Rootsi avaliku sektori teenustega kaasneva kulu Euroopa Keskpanga poolt tehtud uurimuses, mille kohaselt saab 23'st arenenud riigist kõige vähem avalike teenuseid ühe dollari eest just rootslane.

Norberg lahkab ka Rootsi majandusprobleeme ja seda just innovatsiooni silmas pidades:

On the economic side, the old Swedish system of encouraging investments in big industry worked well, as long as there was little need for innovation. Once that occurred, however, the system ran into trouble. The competitiveness of industry had to be propped up several times by depreciating the currency. Globalization and the new knowledge and service economy made it more important than ever to invest in human capital and individual creativity. High marginal tax rates on personal income, however, reduced individuals' incentives to take risks and to boost earning potential by investing in their education and skills, and made it extremely difficult to attract skilled workers from abroad.

Furthermore, the Swedish model was dependent on having a small number of large industrial companies. As these diminished in importance, or moved abroad, Sweden needed something to take their place. But the policies that benefited the biggest firms created a deficit of small- and medium-sized businesses. Those that did exist didn't grow, partly because of the risks and costs of highly burdensome employment rules that prevented the firing of workers. Indeed, the most important Swedish companies today are those that were born during the laissez faire period before the First World War; just one of the fifty biggest Swedish companies was founded after 1970. Meanwhile, services that could become new private growth sectors, like education and health care, were monopolized and financed by the government. As they grew in importance and size, a steadily growing part of the Swedish economy thus became protected from international market forces and investments that could have turned them into successful and productive enterprises.

Loomulikult ei piirdu Norbergi analüüs sellega vaid peatub ka sellistel heaoluriigi kõrvalnähtustele nagu suutmatus majanduskasvu tingimustes töökohti luua, maailma terveimate inimeste jätkuv haigestumine tööl olles ja sellest tulenevad massiivsed haigushüvitised, mis moodustavad 16% riigi eelarvest.

Norberg lõpetab enda artikli hoiatusega sellest, et Rootsi on jõutud punktini, kus mingeid olulisi muutusi riigi poliitikas ilma suurema kriisita teha on praktiliselt võimatu.

Mida sellest kõigest järeldada: eestlased ei tohi ja neil ei tasu minna rootslaste tallatud rada.