Madalama sissetulekuga inimeste laenuvõimalustest USA's (ja kaudselt Eestis)

Täna torkasid silma mõned postitused, mis käsitlesid n.n. krediidisnoobe ehk inimesi, kelle arvates ei tohiks väiksema sissetulekuga inimesed eriti midagi laenata. Alustaks siis rumalamast jutust kõige pealt.

Üllataval kombel pärineb rumalam jutt The Poverty Business Business Week'ist, mille ajakirjanikel ja toimetajatel võiks olla tegelikult piisavalt teadmisi, et mitte sellist pealiskaudset jura välja paisata. Õnneks ärritas artikkel Russ Robertsit Cafe Hayek'ist kirjutama postitust, mis artikli pealiskaudsust edukalt torpedeerib. Üks väike tsitaat kah, kus sõna "America" võiks asendada vabalt sõnaga "Estonia":

So yes, indebtedness is up in America. Most of that debt is housing. So people have more debt but they also have more assets—median net worth over that time period has gone up for every group except the second lowest quintile. So people are borrowing more but their assets are generally worth more.

Alex Tabarrok viitab Marginal Revolution'is aga USA kekspanga esimehe Ben Bernanke sõnavõtule The Subprime Mortgage Market, kus endine akadeemik selgitab natuke põhjalikumalt, miks on inimestel, kes mõned aastad tagasi laenu ei saanud, täna siiski laenu võimalik saada:

Having emerged more than two decades ago, subprime mortgage lending began to expand in earnest in the mid-1990s, the expansion spurred in large part by innovations that reduced the costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks. In particular, technological advances facilitated credit scoring by making it easier for lenders to collect and disseminate information on the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers. In addition, lenders developed new techniques for using this information to determine underwriting standards, set interest rates, and manage their risks.

The ongoing growth and development of the secondary mortgage market has reinforced the effect of these innovations. Whereas once most lenders held mortgages on their books until the loans were repaid, regulatory changes and other developments have permitted lenders to more easily sell mortgages to financial intermediaries, who in turn pool mortgages and sell the cash flows as structured securities. These securities typically offer various risk profiles and durations to meet the investment strategies of a wide range of investors. The growth of the secondary market has thus given mortgage lenders greater access to the capital markets, lowered transaction costs, and spread risk more broadly, thereby increasing the supply of mortgage credit to all types of households.

Muide, Bernanke teksti lugedes ei tasu unustada, et Eestis "subprime mortage" ekvivalent minu teada puudub, seega on meie laenuturul veel arenguruumi eriti kui Eesti pangandus tihedamalt Rootsi omaga põimub.