Venemaa ei suudaks enam USA tuumarünnakule reageerida

Foreign Affairs märtsi/aprilli numbrist võib leida ühe huvitava artikli The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, mille autorid väidavad, et ei Venemaa ega Hiina suudaks USA tuumarünnakule enam adekvaatselt ega piisavalt kiiresti reageerida:

Today, for the first time in almost 50 years, the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy. It will probably soon be possible for the United States to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike. This dramatic shift in the nuclear balance of power stems from a series of improvements in the United States' nuclear systems, the precipitous decline of Russia's arsenal, and the glacial pace of modernization of China's nuclear forces. Unless Washington's policies change or Moscow and Beijing take steps to increase the size and readiness of their forces, Russia and China -- and the rest of the world -- will live in the shadow of U.S. nuclear primacy for many years to come.

Artiklist selgub, et Hiina tehnoloogiline võimekus on jätkuvalt piiratud ja tuumaarsenali moderniseerimine käib väga aeglaselt samas, kui Venemaa tuumaarsenal on kahanenud ja lagunenud:

Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use.
. . .
The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces -- is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces.

Lisaks sellele ei ole venelaste satelliitide võrgustik kaugeltki see, mis ta olla võiks ja radarite poolt kaetud piirkondades on suuri auke, mis teevad Venemaa sedavõrd haavatavaks esmasele rünnakule, et rünnakust ei teataks midagi enne, kui plahvatavad esimesed pommid.

Artikkel on huvitav ning baseerub hästi argumenteeritud ning üpriski konservatiivsetel stsenaariumitel, mis annab alust arvata, et tegelikult on esmalöögi võimekus USA'l juba saavutatud.

Seda mõtet tasub mõned hetked seedida...!

Vastupidiselt Külmasõja aegsetele arengutele, kus ressursse pumbati just uutesse platvormidesse ja investeeriti meeletuid summasid erinevate võimaluste välja ehitamiseks, siis praegune võimekus saavutatud peamiselt olemas olevale tehnoloogiale väikseid täiendusi tehes:

Current modernization programs involve incremental improvements to existing systems. The recycling of warheads and reentry vehicles from the air force's retired MX missiles (there are even reports that extra MX warheads may be put on navy submarine-launched missiles) is the sort of efficient use of resources that does not fit a theory based on parochial competition for increased funding. Rather than reflect organizational resource battles, these steps look like a coordinated set of programs to enhance the United States' nuclear first-strike capabilities.

Esimesed reaktsioonid Moskvast pole just eriti üllatavad olnud, pigem vastupidi:

The U.S. has not acquired nuclear primacy, Russian forces are well capable of holding it back in the near future, well-known military expert Vladimir Dvorkin was quoted by Interfax as saying Wednesday.

“At least until 2015 Russia’s nuclear restraining potential is not going to decrease. The strategic rocket forces are armed with long-term service launching devices, capable of striking back effectively,” said Dvorkin, chief research worker at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and former head of Russia’s Military Research Institute.